The purpose of CO2 pricing is simple: to steer sustainable behavior to reduce pollution. In that context, there is good news. The price incentive works, as the European pricing system proves. Emissions from the sectors within this system - the European Union Emissions Trading System, (EU ETS) - fell by as much as 35 per cent between 2005 and 2019 .
And this is just the beginning. Brussels announced in December that the system will also apply to road transport and buildings. Shipping will also be covered by EU ETS. Higher prices for CO2-intensive products will align the choices of producers and consumers with the social interest of reducing overall CO2 emissions.
Not everyone is enthusiastic about the European pricing system. For example, a number of EU member states that are heavily dependent on fossil fuels are critical of EU ETS because it could lead to relatively high costs and thus, energy poverty. In addition, the system worsens income distribution between countries and between income groups.
Our analysis shows that lower income groups are indeed hit harder by CO2 pricing than higher incomes. This is the case at the moment - when the costs of the damage from CO2 emissions are fully passed on while spending patterns remain unchanged.
Our calculation and analysis show the following:
This was calculated based on:
We made the following assumptions:
A price incentive on CO2 thus hits low-income earners disproportionately hard. In addition, the historically high energy prices at the moment are reviving the (international) discussion on softening CO2 pricing.
Despite the fact that it is more than undesirable in social terms to hit low incomes four times harder, we still support this price incentive.
The government does not have to choose between combating climate change and limiting the burden on lower incomes. With income policy, for example through income tax, the side effect of income inequality can be addressed. By doing this in addition to carbon pricing, consumers can make choices when spending their income that are more in line with societal interests because prices reflect the true costs to society.
The EU itself is also taking a step in this direction. The expansion of ETS is accompanied by an 86 billion euro social climate fund to compensate vulnerable households for the costs of energy transition. This fund addresses the inequality that climate policy causes, but keeps incentives intact.
This is also in line with the theory of famed economist Jan Tinbergen. The winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics says that whoever wants to implement (economic) policy needs as many policy instruments as goals. In other words, a policy measure can only serve one purpose.
Those who follow Tinbergen see that designing CO2 pricing in a way that spares the lowest incomes is impossible. You cannot both pursue an effective climate policy and at the same time use that same instrument to prevent further income inequality. After all, climate policy is not an income policy.
To meet climate goals, price incentives are being implemented at both the national and European levels to reduce emissions. CO2 pricing is a good example of this and, in short, puts a price on societal damage.
A price on CO2 emissions ensures that more sustainable products become relatively more attractive. This is because it ensures that in CO2-intensive production processes, the actual costs of the social damage caused are internalized. This makes these products relatively more expensive than products that cause no or less damage. Companies and citizens are thus incentivized to produce and consume lesser emissions.